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Losing Ground Against Drugs
A Report on Increasing Illicit Drug Use and National Drug
Policy
Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Utah, Chairman
Prepared By
Majority Staff Senate Committee on the Judiciary
Introduction
Through the 1980s and into the early 1990s, the United States
experienced dramatic and unprecedented reductions in casual drug
use.
The number of Americans using illicit drugs plunged from 24.7
million in 1979 to 11.4 million in 1992. The so-called
"casual" use of cocaine fell by 79 percent between 1985
and 1992, while monthly cocaine use fell 55 percent between 1988
and 1992 alone-from 2.9 million to 1.3 million users.
On the surface, little appears to have changed since 1992. For
the nation as a whole, drug use remains relatively flat. The vast
majority of Americans still do not use illegal drugs.
Unfortunately, this appearance is dangerously misleading. Drug
use has in fact experienced a dramatic resurgence among our
youth, a disturbing trend that could quickly return the United
States to the epidemic of drug use that characterized the decade
of the 1970s.
Recent surveys, described in detail in this report, provide
overwhelming evidence of a sharp and growing increase in drug use
among young people:
- The number of 12-17 year-olds using marijuana increased
from 1.6 million in 1992 to 2.9 million in 1994. The
category of "recent marijuana use" increased a
staggering 200 percent among 14- 15 year-olds over the
same period.
- Since 1992, there has been a 52 percent jump in the
number of high-school seniors using drugs on a monthly
basis, even as worrisome declines are noted in peer
disapproval of drug use.
- One in three high school seniors now smokes marijuana.
- Young people are actually more likely to be aware of the
health dangers of cigarettes than of the dangers of
marijuana.
Nor have recent increases been confined to marijuana. At least
three surveys note increased use of inhalants and other drugs
such as cocaine and LSD.
Drug use by young people is alarming by any standard, but
especially so since teen drug use is at the root of hard-core
drug use by adults. According to surveys by the Center on
Addiction and Substance Abuse, 12-17 year-olds who use marijuana
are 85 times more likely to graduate to cocaine than those who
abstain from marijuana. Fully 60 percent of adolescents who use
marijuana before age 15 will later use cocaine. Conversely, those
who reach age 21 without ever having used drugs almost never try
them later in life.
Described another way, perhaps 820,000 of the new crop of
youthful marijuana smokers will eventually try cocaine. Of these
820,000 who try cocaine, some 58,000 may end up as regular users
and addicts.
The implications for public policy are clear. If such
increases are allowed to continue for just two more years,
America will be at risk of returning to the epidemic drug use of
the 1970s. Should that happen, our ability to control health care
costs, reform welfare, improve the academic performance of our
school-age children, and de-fuse the projected "crime
bomb" of youthful super-predator criminals, will all be
seriously compromised.
With these thoughts in mind, I am pleased to present
"Losing Ground Against Drugs: A Report on Increasing Illicit
Drug Use and National Drug Policy" prepared at my direction
by the majority staff of the United States Senate Committee on
the Judiciary. This report examines trends in drug use and the
Clinton Administration's sometimes uneven response to them,
including the Administration's controversial policy of targeting
chronic, hardcore drug users. The report also reviews the state
of trends in use and availability. And, finally, it evaluates the
performance over the past three years of our nation's criminal
justice and interdiction systems.
The report finds federal law enforcement under severe strain
just as the technical sophistication of drug trafficking
syndicates is reaching new heights. It finds that the
Administration's supply reduction policy is in utter disarray,
with a 53 percent drop in our ability to interdict and push back
drug shipments in the transit zone. The report also finds
increases in the purity of drugs and the number of drug-related
emergency room admissions of hard-core users.
Federal drug policy is at a crossroads. Ineffectual leadership
and failed federal policies have combined with ambiguous cultural
messages to generate changing attitudes among our young people
and sharp increases in youthful drug use.
The American people recognize these problems and are
increasingly concerned: A Gallup poll released December 12,1995
shows that 94 percent of Americans view illegal drug use as
either a "crisis" or a "very serious
problem." Their concern, which I share, underscores the
danger of compromising our struggle against the drug trade. I
look forward to addressing the issues raised in this report in
future hearings of the United States Senate Committee on the
Judiciary.
Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman
United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary
December 19, 1995
Overview
For its first eight months in office, the Clinton
Administration's approach to the drug issue could best be
described as benign neglect. Then, in September 1993, the
Administration announced a new approach to drug policy, promising
to "reinvent our drug control programs" and "move
beyond ideological debates." The new Administration policy
de-emphasized law enforcement and shifted away from interdiction,
while promising dividends from treating hard-core drug users.(NOTE 1)
Almost three years into the Administration, however, the
results of its early neglect, and subsequent policy
"reinvention," are in. Drug use is up-dramatically so
among young people. Promised reductions in hardcore use-the
centerpiece of the Administration strategy-have failed to
materialize. New money to expand the nation's treatment system
has coincided with a projected decrease in treatment
"slots."(NOTE 2)
Law enforcement efforts, meanwhile, are not keeping pace with
the kingpins who run the drug trade, whose resources and
technical sophistication are increasing yearly. Prosecutorial
efforts appear to have stumbled as well, with a 12 percent
decline in prosecutions over just two years.
Presidentially ordered interdiction cuts appear to have
resulted in an increased supply of drugs on American streets.
Illicit drugs are now available in greater quantities, at higher
purity, and at lower prices than ever before. The
Administration's strategy for coping with these problems is
predicated on a series of goals that one drug policy expert
described as "merely an unprioritized list [that does
little] to direct policy." (NOTE 3
Viewed together, these factors paint a disturbing picture of
inatten-tion to a serious and growing national threat.
Youthful drug use up sharply
A recent Carnegie Foundation report warns that:
Barely out of childhood, young people ages ten to fourteen are
today experiencing more freedom, autonomy, and choice than ever
at a time when they still need special nurturing, protection, and
guidance. Without the sustained involvement of parents and other
adults in safeguarding their welfare, young adolescents are at
risk of harming themselves and others. (NOTE 4)
Lately, an increasing part of the "harm" referred to
in the Carnegie report has been taking the form of increased drug
use: Over the past two years, almost every available indicator
shows that youthful drug use has increased dramatically after
years of consistent declines.(see Fig. A)
In September 1995, the Department of Health and Human Services
released the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, (Household
Sur-vey) which showed that marijuana use had increased by an
average of 50 percent among young people.
Increases were especially pronounced in certain age groups.
The category of "recent marijuana use" was up a
staggering 200 percent among 14-15 year-olds; among 12-13
year-olds, use was up 137 percent. (NOTE 5)
Translated into raw numbers, this means that in 1994, the
number of youthful, past-year marijuana users reached 2.9
million, compared to 1.6 million in 1992 (See Fig. B) . In other words, nearly 1.3 million more
young people are smoking marijuana today than were doing so in
1992.
Voluminous evidence now confirms the dangers of marijuana use.
Marijuana impairs short-term memory, core motor functions, and
the ability to concentrate. Used during pregnancy, it can lead to
low-IQ babies.
Researchers have traced these recent increases to declining
peer disapproval, which in turn is driven by fewer young people
believing that drug use is harmful. University of Michigan
Researcher Lloyd D. Johnston, who conducts an annual survey of
drug use among 8th, 10th, and 12th graders, (NOTE
6) has written that "'[p]eer norms appear to shift with
changes in the perceived dangers of a drug'.... In the case of
marijuana, the proportion of high-school seniors who disapproved
of even trying" marijuana reached a high of 70 percent in
1992.(NOTE 7) Yet when perceived risk began to
drop, peer disapproval began to fall as well (from 70 percent in
1992 to 58 percent in 1994).
As peer disapproval fell, youthful drug use began a steep
upward trajectory that continues to this day. As Figure C illustrates, past-month use of
marijuana rose 110 percent for 8th graders, 95 percent for 10th
graders, and 60 percent among 12th graders, between 1992 and
1994. Johnston predicts that "[i]f the softening of
attitudes and peer norms continues unabated, we can expect to see
continued increases in drug use among our children."
In addition to surveying youthful drug use, the Household
Survey also estimates the prevalence of adult use of a wide
variety of illegal drugs, including marijuana, cocaine, and
hallucinogens, as well as the nonmedical use of prescription
drugs.
The Survey's annual estimate of overall drug use, which
includes all age groups, showed little change in 1994, rising
slightly to 12.2 million users, as compared to 11.7 million users
the year before. The Survey is important because it measures drug
use among the 98 percent of the population living in households.
Its chief limitation is that it does not cover traditional
high-use populations such as college students living in
dormitories or homeless addicts not living in shelters.
Trends in hard-core drug use
One survey that does capture the traditional high-risk
populations is the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN), which
monitors the number and pattern of drug-related emergencies and
deaths in 21 major metropolitan areas across the country. DAWN is
closely watched as a bellwether of hard-core use because so many
emergency room cases involve addicts and heavy users.
In 1995, the DAWN results were scrutinized for possible
vindication of the Clinton Administration's controversial focus
on rehabilitating hardcore drug addicts. President Clinton
announced the policy shift in a message to Congress, in which he
wrote of "chang[ing] the focus of drug policy by targeting
chronic, hardcore drug users."(NOTE 8)
Unfortunately, the latest DAWN results contained nothing but
bad news.(NOTE 9) As
Figure D illustrates , cocaine-related episodes hit their
high-est level in history. Marijuana-related episodes jumped 39
percent-and are running at 155 percent above the 1990 level.
Methamphetamine cases rose 256 percent over the 1991 level, as
shown in Figure F , portending a
potential epidemic of methamphetamine abuse as Mexican
laboratories ensure a steady, cheap supply of the stimulant.
Heroin-related episodes, which had jumped 66 percent in 1993,
remain at the same high level as last year, although significant
jumps were noted in specific metropolitan areas. In Baltimore,
for example, the rate of emergency room admissions increased by
54 percent, from 259 to 398 per 100,000 population, between 1993
and 1994. (NOTE 10)
According to the Department of Health and Human Services,
(HHS) increases in emergency room admissions are being driven in
part by drug overdoses, by the chronic effects of drug use, and
by addicts seeking "detox." As
shown in Figure E , a record number of emergency room
admissions are for hard-core users, the very population that the
Clinton Administration drug strategy promised to reduce.
Inefficiencies in the treatment system
The Administration's focus on hard-core users has relied
heavily on the application of federal drug treatment resources.
For instance, the President's Drug Strategy states that "The
Nation must utilize every opportunity to get chronic, hardcore
drug users into treatment." (NOTE 11)
Federal treatment budgets have enjoyed consistent support over
the years. In fact, whereas interdiction spending today is well
below the level of five years ago, federal treatment spending
increased in every year between 1982 and 1995. (NOTE
12 Paradoxically, these large budget increases have not led
to a concomitant expansion in treatment capacity, which has
remained almost flat since 1989. (NOTE 13) All
the signs are that the treatment bureaucracy is not making
efficient use of federal resources, yet there is no indication
that the Administration has come to grips with this problem.
Drug availability up
The price and purity of illegal drugs on the street is an
important, if imprecise, indicator of the availability of drugs. As Figure G illustrates , current
price/purity data show cocaine prices at their lowest point since
data collection began in 1981. Between February 1993 and February
1995, the retail price of a gram of cocaine fell from $172 to
$137. Even larger drops were noted for heroin-from $2,032 to
$1,278 per gram over the same period (Figure
H). Moreover, the purity of street-level heroin has reached
record levels, while cocaine is at near-record purity levels. (Note 14)
The data show that cheaper and purer drugs are getting through
to American streets in greater quantities than ever before.
Absent evidence of a reduction in drug demand, it is reasonable
to conclude that this reflects a substantial increase in supply.
Reinforcing this conclusion is the converse example of sharp
price in-creases due to major disruptions in supply. In 1990, for
example, an intense law enforcement crackdown on the Medellin
Cartel by the Colombian government, combined with concerted U.S.
interdiction efforts, paralleled steep increases in the price of
cocaine. As shown in Figure I, those price increases coincided
with diminished evidence of cocaine use in the United States,
including drug-related emergency room admissions and overdose
deaths. (Note 15)
The social consequences of drug use
Hard-core users consume the bulk of illicit drugs in the
United States, helping to fuel social pathologies and criminal
violence, which has much of its roots in the consolidation and
enforcement of drug sales territories.
In drug markets, violence is often a "means to achieve
'economic regulation and control' .... As one expert [has]
explained..., '[i]n an underground economy, you can't sue. So you
use violence to enforce your breaches of contract or perceived
breaches of contract.'"
The data bear out this conclusion. Studies conducted between
l978 and 1988 in Miami, New York City, and Washington, D.C.,
found that ap-proximately one-quarter to one-half of homicides
were drug-related. (Note 16) A study of over
400 homicides in New York City in 1988 found that over half were
linked to drugs or alcohol. (Note 17)
A 1994 article in The Journal of the American Medical
Association found that nearly three out of every l0 victims of
homicide in New York City in the early 1990s had cocaine in their
system at the time of death. Overall, murder victims in the city
are 10 to 50 times more likely than members of the general
population to have been cocaine users. (Note 18)
Drug use often lies at the center of other social problems.
Drug use, and the use of crack cocaine and heroin in particular,
is associated with a higher risk of transmitting the AIDS virus. (Note 19) Crack cocaine smokers exhibit more
high-risk sexual behaviors, while intravenous heroin use has
contributed to a significant and growing portion of AIDS
sufferers. The situation has become so alarming that some
epidemiologists have advocated needle exchange programs to limit
the spread of HIV infection. Additionally, drug use sometimes
leads to prostitution as a means of financing drug habits,
thereby encouraging the spread of HIV and other sexually
transmitted diseases.(Note 20)
Drug use also has profound negative effects upon family
structure, as illustrated in this description of the effects of
cocaine use:
As users become cocaine dependent, their family and social
lives disintegrate. They concentrate their energies on finding
the next dose; employed users may spend all earnings on cocaine;
a parent may leave children unsupervised for extended periods. (Note 21)
Drug addiction destroys interfamilial relationships and often
lies at the heart of the physical and emotional abuse that drug
addicts visit on their spouse or children. The products of these
devastated families, in turn, become the engine that drives
future increases in the crime rate.
Drug use also fuels property crime. As drug users become more
dependent, they become unable to hold down steady employment. As
the habit devours the body, the addict often undertakes criminal
activities in order to fund a growing addiction. Drug use and the
resultant crime both burden the health care system with increased
social costs for drug addicts and the victims of their crimes.
Drug control efforts: The federal response
Beyond the severity of the social problems caused by drug use,
com-pelling reasons exist to continue the federal role in drug
law enforcement. As with the problems of illegal immigration and
organized crime, where the paramount federal role is readily
acknowledged, the drug crisis knows no borders. Drug sales and
trafficking are interstate in nature, and securing the national
borders from illegal drug imports is a role that constitutionally
only the federal government can fulfill. (Note 22)Much of the narcotics trade is an international enterprise,
with cultivation, production, and manufacture typically taking
place overseas. It is not an exaggeration to state that the drug
trade encompasses one of the greatest internal, as well as
external, threats facing our nation today.
Yet perhaps nowhere are the problems facing federal law
enforcement demonstrated with more troubling clarity than in the
state of the war on illegal drugs. Federal law enforcement is
under enormous strain. Increasingly, those charged with enforcing
federal laws are being as-signed greater responsibility without a
sufficient increase in the resources needed to fulfill that
responsibility.
Unfortunately, efforts to stanch the supply of drugs also
provide stark examples of the effect of misdeployment of federal
funding and the impact of cutbacks to supply reduction
enforcement resources.
Enforcement efforts under pressure
Enforcement of the nation's drug laws, a core function of the
federal government, has been neglected by the Clinton
Administration. The Administration's inattention to drug law
enforcement was reflected in its fiscal year 1995 budget, which
would have cut a total of 621 drug enforcement positions from the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI), Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), U.S. Customs Service, and U.S. Coast Guard. (Note
23) Congress wisely restored a number of these proposed cuts,
although the DEA still lost 227 agent positions between September
1992 and September 1995. (Note 24)
Rather than arguing for cuts, the increasing power and
sophistication of Colombian and Mexican trafficking organizations
underscore the need for a robust, well-coordinated federal drug
control effort.
A single recent case against the Cali drug mafia-Operation
FOXHUNT -- illustrates the magnitude of the challenge facing drug
law enforcement in the 1990s. "FOXHUNT" is the code
name given to a two-year DEA investigation of a major Cali Cartel
transportation op-eration centered in Los Angeles. The
investigation targeted two Colombian "transportation
directors" responsible for the movement of multi-ton
quantities of cocaine from main distribution points in Los
Angeles to wholesale distributors in New York City, San
Francisco, and Chicago. The Cali mafia's skillful
compartmentalization meant that the two directors, or "cell
heads," were not aware of the Cartel's other smuggling
activities.
By the time the investigation had been concluded in October
1994, some 55 agencies and State and local police departments had
been involved, six tons of cocaine had been seized, and more than
220 suspects had been indicted-including the two cell heads.
Cases of this unprecedented magnitude have required
investigators and U.S. Attorneys to develop new techniques to
ensure interagency co-ordination and efficient case management.
Because senior managers in Colombia and Mexico typically control
even the most innocuous activi-ties of their U.S.-based
subordinates, cases like FOXHUNT have also relied heavily on
penetrating trafficker communications.
Ready trafficker access to illegally altered cellular phones
and digi-tal pagers, as well the advent of new communications
technologies such as digital cellular phones and Personal
Communications Services (PCS) devices, has seriously complicated
the task of federal law enforcement agencies as they seek to
build cases and bring traffickers to justice. The Senate
Committee on the Judiciary has received and is considering
legislative proposals to address these and other law enforcement
concerns.
Declining drug prosecutions
The Administration's cuts to drug enforcement resources has
coincided with a marked decline in drug prosecutions between 1992
and 1994. This decline in drug prosecutorial efforts is
consistent with a general de-crease in federal prosecutorial
efforts over the past two years.
As detailed in Figure J, the number
of individuals prosecuted for federal drug violations dropped
from 25,033 in 1992 to 23,114 in 1993, and still lower to 21,905
in 1994 -- a 12 percent drop in just two years. (Note
25)
Faltering interdiction efforts
A significant part of President George Bush's drug strategy,
interdiction has been largely abandoned by the present
Administration. On November 3, 1993, a Presidential statement
proclaimed the Administration's new strategy, which referred to a
"change of emphasis" (Note 26)
including the controlled shift of assets out of the so-called
"transit zone." (Note 27) During the
same day, commenting on the new policy before a Congressional
committee, the Director of the Office of National Drug Control
Policy, (ONDCP) Lee P. Brown, testified that:
Holding on to programs because they make us look
"tough" but accomplish little fails to be honest with
the American people, who want a drug strategy that effectively
responds to the realities of the drug problem America faces. (Note 28)
Yet, as this report demonstrates, interdiction cuts over the
past three years have seriously undermined the U.S. government's
interdiction system. The lack of resources committed to
interdiction efforts has translated directly to the arrival of
drugs on American streets. Interdiction cutbacks have lowered
traffickers' cost of doing business, apparently allowing the
retail price of drugs to fall at the same time that the number of
overdoses and emergency room admissions is increasing.
Because the source countries' productive capacity can always
be increased to accommodate losses of product, repeated seizures
accom-plish little without law enforcement follow-up against the
organization smuggling the drugs. That follow-up is not possible
when interdiction assets are unable to respond to a particular
smuggling event. In other words, cuts to interdiction
capabilities have the potential to hurt the criminal justice
"end-game" all the way from arrests of low-level drug
smugglers to convictions of high-level drug kingpins.
Interdiction cuts reduce seizures
Budget cuts have also seriously hurt the U.S. government's
ability to seize and interdict drugs in the transit zone and at
our borders. Transit zone seizures are down, street prices are
down, and Cali traffickers are teaming up with Mexican drug
barons to fly multi-ton loads of cocaine into Mexico aboard
modified commercial jetliners. (Note 29)
Between 1993 and the first six months of 1995, the transit
zone "disruption rate"-the ability of U.S. forces to
seize or otherwise turn back drug shipments-dropped 53 percent,
from 435.1 kilograms per day to 205.2 kilograms, as shown in
Figure K. (Note 30) Over the course of a year,
the lowered disruption rate means that as much as 84 metric tons
(mt.) of additional cocaine and marijuana could be arriving
unimpeded on the streets of the United States through the Eastern
transit zone alone.
Interdiction in the transit zone is accomplished primarily by
three federal agencies: the Department of Defense (DoD), the U.S.
Customs Service (USCS), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG).
Responsibility for ensuring adequate drug interdiction funding
for these agencies currently rests with Admiral Robert D. Kramek,
United States Coast Guard. Appointed by the Director of ONDCP to
serve as an ombudsman for the entire interdiction program,
Admiral Kramek's role is to fight for money and interdiction
resource allocations from participating agencies and to
coordinate policy implementation. (Note 31)
At a hearing before the National Security Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight on March 9,
1995, it was learned that Admiral Kramek had sent a memorandum to
Lee P. Brown, Director of ONDCP, urging him to arrange a meeting
with President Clinton. (Note 32) The purpose
of that proposed meeting was to inform the President that a
consensus had developed among interdiction agency heads that it
was necessary to return to Bush Administration levels of
interdiction funding. Director Brown, apparently ignoring the
memoran-dum, declined to arrange a meeting. He has since
acknowledged that he failed to relay Admiral Kramek's concerns to
the President because he was unconvinced that interdiction
spending produced sufficient "bang for the buck." (Note 33) Statistics, however, bear out what
Admiral Kramek told Director Brown.
The overall proportion of the Customs Service budget devoted
to drug control fell from 45.5 percent in fiscal year 1991, to a
projected 33.9 percent in fiscal year 1996.(Note
34) As Figure L illustrates,
Clinton Administration cuts to the Customs Service interdiction
budget coincided with a 70 percent decline in Customs-supported
cocaine seizures in the transit-zone, from 35.4 mt. of cocaine in
fiscal year 1993 to 10.8 mt. in fiscal year 1995. The number of
trafficker aircraft seized by Customs in the transit zone fell
from 37 to 10 during the same period. Customs Service transit
zone flight hours, a rough indicator of the agency's focus on
interdiction, fell from 9,844 in fiscal year 1993 to 6,870 in
fiscal year 1995. (Note 35) Total Customs
Service flight hours are down as well, from 56,134 in fiscal year
1993 (Note 36) to a projected 41,800 in fiscal
year 1996. (Note 37)
In budget terms, the Customs Service interdiction
appropriation has been cut nearly 20 percent, from $588.8 million
in fiscal year 1992 to $473.5 million in fiscal year 1995. (Note 38) Among other things, these cuts forced
the agency to mothball 22 fixed-wing aircraft and five
sophisticated UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, vital tools in the
interdiction effort. (Note 39)
Department of Defense (DoD) interdiction assets have been cut
back as well, a critical misjudgment, since lead agency
responsibility for the aerial and maritime detection and
monitoring of drug traffickers is reposed by statute within DoD.
Between fiscal years 1992 and 1995, interdiction budgets (known
as "optempo") were reduced by more than half, from
$275.7 to $130.7 million. (Note 40) As Figure M illustrates, DoD airborne
detection and monitoring assets were cut back from 3,400 to 1,850
hours during the same period.
The use of Navy vessels (measured in so-called "steaming
days") was cut from 420 to 170 steaming days. The number of
DoD ground-based radar sites increased from 11 to 18 between
fiscal year 1992 and 1994, although a number of those sites are
now slated for closure as the military's Relocatable
Over-the-Horizon Radar (ROTHR) system comes on line. Despite
excessive interdiction cutbacks, DoD has been providing enhanced
support in other areas, such as a program to provide intelligence
and related support to drug law enforcement agencies targeting
major overseas trafficking organizations.
The Committee has been unable to establish other critical
aspects of DoD's contribution to drug supply reduction, such as
the priority level assigned to the drug control mission by
regional DoD Commanders-in-Chief, because Secretary of Defense
William J. Perry has not responded to repeated oversight requests
over an eight-month period.
Interdiction efforts of the United States Coast Guard have
also been curtailed significantly over the past two years. The
Coast Guard operating expense budget for drug missions fell from
$449.2 million in fiscal year 1991 to a projected $314.2 million
in fiscal year 1996. Cutter and aircraft resource hours are
projected to fall 23 and 34 percent, respectively, over the same
period. (Note 41) The overall proportion of
the Coast Guard budget devoted to drug control has fallen from 21
percent in fiscal year 1991, (Note 42) to a
projected eight percent in fiscal year 1996, as the Coast Guard
focuses on other missions deemed to be of higher priority. (Note 43)
Between fiscal years 1994 and 1995, the Coast Guard was forced
to mothball the following drug interdiction assets: five 82-foot
patrol boats, three surface effect ships, seven HU-25 Falcon
aircraft, and one medium-endurance cutter. It makes little sense
to mothball expensive hardware, bought and paid for by the
American taxpayer for the war on drugs, while narcotics are
flowing virtually unimpeded into the country.
Not surprisingly, Coast Guard seizures are off: Cocaine
seizures fell more than 45 percent since fiscal year 1989, from
7.2 mt. in fiscal year 1989 to 3.9 mt. for the first 11 months of
fiscal year 1995, and remain 73 percent below the peak of fiscal
year 1991, when they hit 14.8 mt. Marijuana seizures fell even
more dramatically, from 134.2 mt. to 13 mt. during the same
period. The number of Coast Guard vessel seizures fell 88
percent, from 152 in fiscal year 1989 to 19 in fiscal year 1995.
Controlled shift was never implemented
The tradeoff for cuts to transit zone interdiction forces was
to have been a "new" concentration on
institution-building and interdiction in the source countries of
Latin America-an idea recognized by some for its similarity to
the Bush Administration's "Andean Strategy." (Note 44) More than 18 months after unveiling the
new strategy, however, ONDCP Director Brown acknowledged to a
Congressional committee that the shift had not taken place. (Note 45)
Foreign assistance funding to the Andean region has, in fact,
been steadily declining. As Fugure N
illustrates international counternarcotics funding to the
Andean region fell abruptly under the Clinton Administration,
from $334.9 million in fiscal year 1993 to $131.8 million in
fiscal year 1995 -- a 60 percent drop, and significantly less
than the $470.3 million appropriated in fiscal year 1992 under
President Bush. (Note 46) President Clinton's
December 1993
Summit of Latin American leaders was notable for its focus on
trade and "governance" issues-and its almost complete
lack of attention to the drug is sue. A brief "action
plan" on drugs contained little of note. (Note
47)
This is unfortunate since a modest investment in the source
countries of Latin America can have a major impact. In Peru, for
example, President Alberto Fujimori has been providing drug
dealers with a clear demonstration of his willingness to control
the airspace over the coca-rich Upper Huallaga Valley. Acting on
his orders, the Peruvian Air Force has shot down or otherwise
disabled more than 20 trafficker aircraft since March 1, 1995,
leading to the lowest level of detected flight activity in over
three years.
President Fujimori's hard line on drugs actually prompted the
Clinton Administration to cut Peru off from receiving radar
tracking data, badly damaging bilateral relations in the process.
U.S. government interdiction support for Peruvian
counternarcotics programs has also been held up by a misguided
foreign policy that continues to punish Peru for the April 5,
1992, suspension of democracy at the expense of our critical
national interest in drug control.
Border interdiction lagging
Booming trade with Mexico has posed a major challenge to
agents and inspectors of the United States Customs Service, who
have the lead responsibility for preventing the cross-border
importation of illegal drugs.
Roughly 70 percent of all cocaine enters the United States
across the U.S.-Mexico border, according to DEA. Yet, according
to an investigation conducted by the Los Angeles Times, (Note 48) not a single kilogram of cocaine was
confiscated from the more than two million trucks entering the
country through three of the busiest points of entry along the
Southwest border during fiscal year 1994. (Note
49) Customs agents seized 802 kilograms of cocaine from all
commercial border traffic during fiscal year 1994, compared with
3.5 mt. in fiscal year 1993 when commercial traffic was lighter.
The Customs Service has taken a number of steps to address the
decline in seizures along the Southwest border. On February 25,
1995, Customs announced Operation "HARD LINE," an
initiative to fortify ports of entry against so-called "port
runners," car and truck drivers who smash through inspection
stations with a cargo of illegal drugs. (Note 50)
Another HARD LINE initiative involved the application of new
technology to the fight against smuggling.
Encouragingly, border seizures of cocaine increased somewhat
with the advent of Operation HARD LINE, although overall Customs
Service cocaine seizures for fiscal year 1995 remain 25 percent
below the 1992 level. (Note 51)
Preliminary indications suggest that the push to apply new
inspection technology has not been as successful as hoped. The
$3.2 million Otay Mesa backscatter X-ray scanner, the first of a
number of building-size X-ray devices to be installed along the
Southwest border, finished out its first year of operations
without detecting a single gram of cocaine, despite scanning an
average of 1,900 trailers and vans per day. (Note
52)
A new focus on non-drug "transnational crime"
The Clinton Administration is also allowing specialized
counternarcotics units of the U.S. government to shift their
focus away from drugs and toward a poorly understood phenomenon
sometimes referred to as transnational organized crime. For
instance, the U.S. government's drug-related foreign intelligence
capability is concentrated within the Central Intelligence
Agency's Counter-Narcotics Center (CNC). The CNC has now been
renamed the Crime and Narcotics Center, reflecting a new focus on
the collection of non-drug-related intelligence. The Department
of State's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters has been
reconstituted as the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs and reportedly is attempting to inject itself
into the coordination of the overseas activities of U.S.
government law enforcement agencies. Some shift toward
international organized crime may be inevitable, given reports of
increased non-drug organized criminal activity. It remains to be
seen, however, whether a shift in strategy toward the ill-defined
threat of foreign criminal groups will protect the welfare,
safety, and security of American citizens, or reduce the flow of
illegal drugs.
In the area of money laundering, the Administration has
allowed the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (FinCEN) to devote 50 percent of its time to non-drug
investigations, up from 20 percent in previous years. (Note 53) The President's fiscal year 1996 budget
actually proposed to cut the drug-related portion of FinCEN's
budget from $15.8 million in fiscal year 1995 to $11.1 million in
fiscal year 1996.
The war on drugs can and should be waged effectively on the
financial battlefield. The vigorous prosecution and punishment of
money laundering operations and related crime, together with the
seizure of the drug mafias' financial assets, effectively raises
the costs of this deadly business. It also raises the street
price of drugs, thereby reducing demand. Finally, it sends a
powerful message to the drug lords-we will seize your profits and
strike you wherever we can. Consequently, Congress must monitor
these developments to ensure that our nation's fight against the
drug trade is effectively waged.
Conclusion
Federal drug policy is at a crossroads. Ambiguous cultural
messages and changing attitudes among our young people have
contributed to a sharp increase in the rate of youthful drug use.
Increased use of heroin and methamphetamine by the population
at large threatens to generate vast new addict populations. Cuts
to enforcement programs have frustrated the efforts of line
agents and police officers. By cutting back on drug interdiction,
the federal government has permitted the importation of vast
quantities of illegal drugs, helping to ensure the creation of a
new generation of addicts and complicating the job of every
federal, state, and local law enforcement officer trying to push
back the tide of violent crime generated by the drug trade.
Federal law enforcement agencies are staffed by dedicated
investigators, agents, prosecutors, and corrections personnel.
But these professionals are being asked to do more and more with
essentially the same resources, placing enormous strains on their
agencies.
It is time for the Administration to adopt a balanced drug
strategy. The strategy should target prevention and treatment
resources to areas of need. But it must absolutely ensure that
federal enforcement and interdiction systems receive the support
they need in the fight to keep our nation free from the terror of
violent crime and the other disastrous social consequences of
illegal drug use. The recently passed appropriation for the
Department of Justice increases the budgets of DEA and the FBI,
and will close some of the gap between the level of funding and
the level of need. Thoughtful, well-conceived policies must also
support drug control agencies' mission. The American people
deserve no less.
Figures
Footnotes
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