Defending An Effective Control on National and International Drug
Trade : Challenging the International Drug Conventions
By Christophe Marchand, Member of the Brussels’s Bar
2000
1. International Narcotics Treaties
The Definition of Narcotic Drugs
From 1909 to 1988: Few Historical Elements
2. ”Use Of Drugs” in the Conventions
Between Public Health and Repression
“Use” in the 1988 Convention: the End of a Loophole ?
Textual Exceptions to Prohibition in the 1988 Convention
3. Prohibition of the use of cannabis
The Preparatory Works of the Single Convention
Is Cannabis Always Harmful for Health ?
II. About Interpretation in International Law
1. Are the Parties Bound by the Narcotics Conventions ?
Are the Narcotics Conventions Binding ?
Self-Executing Provisions of the Narcotics Treaties
Misunderstanding a Self-Executing Provision of the Single Convention
2. Drug Policy and Reserved Domain
State Freedom and Reserved Domain
The Intention of the State Parties
3. Interpretation According to the Vienna Convention on Treaties
Introduction: About Official, Textual, Contextual and Modificative Interpretation
The Textual Interpretation and the Legalization
The Limit to Textual Interpretation in International Law
Other Legal Means of Interpretation
Supplementary Means of Interpretation
State Practice and New Customary International Law as a Tool for Modification of Treaties
III. Case-study of A State Practice Towards International Drug Law
1. Legal Evolution of the Spanish Criminal Code
The Legal Criminal Impunity of the Consumer
2. Special Provisions in the Spanish Criminal Code
1. The trafficker and the immune consumer
A Unique Case of “De Iure” Decriminalization
Negative Side-Effects in a Repressive Environment
Administrative Sanction for Users and 1988 Convention
2. The difference between drugs
The Schedules of the Single Convention
Constitutional Exception: Human Rights
Constitutional Exception: National Sovereignty.
“The union of such an army might excite our surprise, but the causes of
separation are obvious and forcible: the pride of birth, the insolence of
valour, the jealousy of command, the impatience of subordination, and the
obstinate conflict of opinions, of interests, and of passions among so many
kings and warriors who were untaught to yield or to obey.”
Edward GIBBON, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, An Abridged Version, Penguin Classics, 1985, p. 573
Introduction
Is the American drug policy
the only possible one that would comply with international drug law ? The
point here, is not to describe in details what is the American drug policy. It
is enough to state that it is a repressive policy, and even an increasing
repressive policy. This simple statement is in opposition with another way of
dealing with the use of drugs: the “legalization
policy”. The question is then: is it
possible to legalize drugs within the frame of the current International
Conventions on Drugs ?
From the first Convention of
1912 to the last one of 1988, there have been huge changes in the way we
consider drugs. First, in relation with the toxicological and medical knowledge
of the products : the irrational fears of satanized substances turned into
a reasonable management of well known risks. Secondly, our society had racist
or at least ethno centrist fears towards the use of non occidental products
causing pleasure or inebriation. Nowadays we can see that these fears turned
into a cultural understanding or even, they have vanished in favour of a
massive use of those “exotic drugs”, so that they have become one of the scheme
of states, driven by worldwide or continental dynamics. Last but not least,
drug use is, has been and will be a part of human life. The religious
mastication of coca leaves by Andean people, the psychological use of Prozac by
the North American nations, as well as the drunk parties where Gauls absorb
hydromel, all these uses of psychoactive products are a part of mankind. On top
of all this, once we accept that a drug free world is not possible, we have to
deal with the use of our time and the drugs people use, how they use it. The universal society now understands and accepts
its contemporaneous way of life characterized by flash information, chemical
and electronic post-industrialization, global interactivity, urban and fast
human activities.
The ideology of drug
policies has evolved from a
survival instinct guided by
imperialistic and moral goals, to a more reasonable attitude driven by
equality, equity and dignity. The
international laws moved in their norms and ideas, the sovereign states
decided to face the International Conventions, and slowly but surely an
universal debate on drug policy have been created. The international vigils
striving for the respect of the ideology contained in the International
Covenants had to accept state practices and realize their lack of ideological
and juridical power to stop and
challenge this worldwide movement of opinion.
At
length, verging towards old age, and sometimes conquering by the terror only
of her name, she sought the blessings of
ease and tranquillity. The Venerable City, which had trampled on the necks of
the fiercest nations and established a system of laws, the perpetual guardians
of justice and freedom, was content, like a wise and wealthy parent, to devolve
on the Caesars, her favourite sons, the care of governing her ample patrimony.
(...)But this native splendour is degraded and sullied by the conduct of some
nobles who, unmindfully of their own dignity and of that of their country,
assume an unbounded licence of vice and folly.”
Edward GIBBON, The Decline and
Fall of the Roman Empire, op.cit., p.
593.
Drugs
can be[1]
either recreative (tobacco, alcohol, cocaine,…), either have a medical utility
(chemical and pharmaceutical products,…) or serve both purposes (heroine[2], opium[3],...). Opioids and cannabis
products are a kind of drugs. As a reference, we use the « summa divisio » of the three major international
conventions in the field of drugs, that differenciate between « narcotics » on the one hand and
« psychotropic substances » on the other hand. In
international law, « narcotics » are not clearly defined[4].
« Narcotics » are the
substances enumerated by the Single Convention of 1961[BM1][5], as
mentioned in article 1.1.j[6].
These narcotics[7] are
the opioids, cocaine and cannabis products. Opioids are all the narcotics
obtained from the poppy (Papaver
Somniferum L.) and listed in Schedules I, II and IV of the Single
Convention. Cannabis products are the narcotics proceeded from the cannabis
plant (Cannabis Indica L.), and listed
in the same schedules as opioids.
It
has been said that narcotics international law started with the war[8].
In fact, the two opium wars of 1839 and 1856 are at the roots of the first
international drug convention. China wanted to ban, for public health reasons,
the opium imported from India by the British Empire. In the name of the free
enterprise, Great Britain wanted the market to be free. Under the influence of
the United States, the Shanghai Convention of 1909 established the first
international regulation on trade of opium[9].
Since 1909, nine other conventions[10]
have been signed, including the Single Convention of 1961.
Today there are three major
international conventions in force in the field of international drug law. The
first one is the Single Convention of 1961[11],
as amended by the Protocol of the 25th march 1972. As we have seen
the convention regulates the three « natural »[12]
drugs. Apart from establishing an international control on the licit traffic in
drugs, the Single Convention requires Parties to the convention to take all
necessary legal and administrative measures to limit exclusively the
production, manufacture, export, import, distribution, trade, use and
possession to medical and scientific goals (article 4 of the Single
Convention). The second Convention is the Convention on Psychotropic
substances, signed in Vienna in February 1971[13].
The 1971 Convention is drafted on the model of the Single Convention but
regulates other types of drugs : the « psychotropic substances » (hallucinogens, amphetamines,
barbiturics and tranquillisers), i.e. all drugs of industrial or synthetic
origin[14].
As its model, the 1971 Convention does not define the drugs it regulates. It
enumerates in lists the drugs it controls[15].
The third convention is the United Nations Convention Against the Illicit Trade
in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances signed in Vienna in December 1988[16].
The aim of this convention is to strengthen and complete the fight against
illicit traffic and abuse of drugs and not to regulate the licit trade [17].
The 1988 Convention requires measures against money laundering, measures in
favour the improvement of international cooperation, extradition and mutual
judicial assistance.
The Single Convention is the
most important treaty since it lays the grounds for control of licit trade and defines what is licit and
what is not. The general principle enunciated in the Single Convention is the
organisation of all activities related to drug trade: culture, fabrication,
importation, exportation, sale, distribution and use. Parties undertake to
limit the use of drugs to medical and scientific needs, in view of protecting
public health.
The Convention
establishes a worldwide control system on the licit traffic in narcotics. This
business is limited principally to the pharmaceutical purposes : the
narcotics necessary in medicine as said in the Preamble. Regarding this
framework, does the treaties authorize a state to pursue a goal that would not
be the criminalization of users and the prohibition of the use of some « evil » narcotics for medical
use ? In other words, can a state legalize and organise the use of
cannabis for recreational (and medical) purposes or the distribution of heroine to
compulsive heroine users ?
If we refer to the aim of
the International Conventions, as it appears from the Preambles, there are two
main goals. On the one hand, the fight against illicit drug trafficking and on
the other hand, the protection of the health and welfare of human beings[18].
Moreover, the words “scientific and
medical purposes » are not to be understood in a stringent fashion[19].
Some exceptions can be found, i.e., industrial, culinary or veterinary use of
narcotics[20].
But, the wordings was chosen in order to emphasize the final aim of the
Convention: “ It is therefore proposed
that the general purpose of international control should be defined in terms of
its final aims and not in terms of intermediary objectives. Consequently, the
Preamble will emphasize the positive aspect of any control of drugs, i.e., to
ensure sufficient supplies for medical and scientific requirements ”[21].
We can also refer to the first words of article 4.c that establishes a
prohibition “subject to the provisions of
this convention”[22].
This means that exceptions to the principle can be found in other articles of
the Single Convention that are serving other purposes than medical and
scientific ones.
This could obviously mean that the Convention does
not only aim at promoting the scientific and medical use of narcotic drugs but
basically, its objective would be to prohibit the use of narcotics for the
pleasure. The “recreational use” of
narcotics would then be an unknown but clearly forbidden concept in these
conventions. Well, what we can be found in opposition to the general obligation
of article 4.c in order to limit the use of drugs to the scientific and to the
medical purposes, is the hypothesis of drug abuse. Again in the third sentence of the Preamble of the Single
Convention, the Parties are « recognizing
that addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the
individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to mankind »[23].
Every non-medical or scientific use would be an « abuse », by « addicts ».
But the Single Convention does not oblige a state to convict or punish a drug
abuser as a Party to the Single Convention can provide for medical or social
care as alternative to penalties. It
could mean that the repression or prohibition of use by a « non addict drug user », if it ever
exists, was not foreseen by the Single Convention. But there is more. As “ the “use” of drugs is not specifically
listed in article 36, par. 1. among the actions which, subject to its
constitutional limitations, a Party must treat as punishable offences. It
appears that it is left to the discretion of each Party to decide whether it
wishes to penalize the non-medical consumption of narcotic drugs by addicts
“[24].
It is as though the Single Convention meant to leave the drug abuser immune, as
opposed to the illicit producer or seller that should be convicted. It is quite
ambiguous : on the one hand, it is forbidden to use drugs other than for
medical and scientific purposes but on the other hand, there are no penalties
on the illicit user…
The 1988 Convention would go
further since it obliges the states to regard as a criminal offence the
possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotics for « personal consumption » (article 3.2). It is a switch in the
International Treaties. The aim of the Single Convention, apart from the
objectives we have seen below, was to provide a worldwide control system on the
production and trade in narcotics and to impose criminal offences for those who
would not respect the rules. The 1988 Convention obliges the Member States to
criminalize the personal consumption of drugs through the wordings “possession for personal use”. It is a
significant switch, as a possible root of the Single Convention (to prohibit
the habit of smoking opium or to use Indian hemp[25])
was not expressed openly. Using the
words “personal consumption”, the
1988 Convention would express something that was obvious in 1961. The need to
say it was drafted in the context of the arising debate on legalization of the
recreational use of drugs[26].
It is interesting to note that the debate would find its expression in the words
used in the Convention. Would this mean that the Single Convention is not clear
enough ? Would it mean so far that drug abuse only is regarded as forbidden ? Would this mean that personal
consumption must be totally forbidden ?
It is controversial. In the
1988 Convention the possession, purchase or cultivation of narcotics for
personal consumption is forbidden if
« contrary to the provisions of the 1961 Convention » as
mentioned in article 3.2, in fine.
Would that mean that possession, purchase and cultivation for personal
consumption can be licit ? Of course, the medical and scientific purposes
are licit. Several authors[27]
already pointed out that the interpretation of the Conventions is possible. LAP
and POLAK analyse three articles of the
Single Convention. They interpret in a large sense article 4.c and the words “medical and scientific purposes”. They understand those words as
containing the concept of “protection of
the public health”, as we can find it in the article 22 of the Convention
and in the Preamble. On the other hand reading the regulatory provisions of the
Single Convention, they see that licit culture, fabrication, sale, import,
purchase and possession of narcotics are regulated in the Convention. As far as
cannabis is concerned, they emphasise article 28.1 of the Convention: “if a Party permits the cultivation of the
cannabis plant for the production of cannabis resin, it shall apply thereto the
system of controls as provided in article 23 respecting the control of the
opium poppy”. This article explicitly mentions the possibility of a
government agency regulating production and distribution of cannabis, as
article 23 regulates in connection with opium. They propose that the governments
that are willing to decriminalize the use of cannabis put that article into
force. We can see it as an example of an interpretation of the Single
Convention. On top of this, article 3.2 of the 1988 Convention limits the
obligation to a State to criminalize the possession for personal consumption by
the « constitutional principles » and the « basic concepts of its legal system ».
It means that some national legal principle can exclude the criminalization of
the cultivation, purchase and possession of narcotics. It could be, for
example, the right to health, or the right to freedom of behaviour, or the
disproportion between the means used to fight illicit drug business and
consume, and the ineffectiveness to reach the desired goal, or even the right to
pleasure as a part of the right to the Privacy.
Furthermore, the 1988
Convention did not banish the ambiguity contained in the principle “prohibition
without sanction”. The Conventions would oblige the Parties to provide for a penalty
on drug consumers. Even if it is not put into force. It is the “tolerance policy”, the « de facto
legalization ». Tolerance in the sense that the Criminal Law of a
country must establish that consuming drugs is prohibited by the Criminal Code.
« De facto » in the sense
that the Criminal Law still exists and that the legalization is not « de jure », by a reform of the
Criminal Code. But, in the application of the law, a State is not obliged to
convict or punish: an “expiation fee” can be enough. Using drugs for
pleasure is a taboo and it would be a « wrong message » to authorize their recreational use. The
problem is that a “de facto”
legalization of the use of narcotics is unfair: as the law remains, as its
application or non-application will depend on the will of the people in charge
of the enforcement of the law. This is unfair as the people with a good social
and family situation, and well-educated could escape from penalties while the
others could not. It is unfair as the policy will not be the same from one
place to the other in a same state. It can be seen as a violation of the basic
and constitutional concept of equality towards law, thus also as a violation of
a human right.
As a first conclusion we can
say that the Conventions does not obviously
prohibit the decriminalization of the culture, purchase, possession of
narcotics for personal consumption. The treaties leave room for a formal
legalization (« de iure »)
of recreational use of drugs even though it is controversial. On the one hand
we have seen that the “constitutional
exception” can be put into force. This means that a government could
reasonably defend the point of view that some of its constitutional principles
hamper the criminalization of the recreational use of drugs. On the other hand,
a government can also declare that the Convention needs to be interpreted in
the sense that the protection of public health requires a regulation of the use
of narcotics for pleasure, in conformity with the international and national
administrative control system of the 1961 Convention.
Now I wish to discuss a
special issue related to the use of cannabis. If we look at the official record
[28]of
the discussions held prior to the conference that was to create the Single
Convention, we find that the “cannabis
question” has been a controversial item. In fact, there were disagreements
between the delegates. On the one hand, some of them considered that the use of
cannabis was not dangerous and on the other hand, some considered that cannabis
could be used as a medical drug. First, I shall consider the recreational drug
use. When I wrote above that “recreational
use” is unknown in the Convention, I must confess that it was not entirely
true. In fact, article 49 of the Single Convention contains the transitional
reservations to the Convention. It permits one State to tolerate the
traditional use of opium smoking, cannabis using and coca leaves chewing during
25 years. Besides, what is specific to cannabis, is that the Indian
representative said during the discussions that using the leaves of cannabis is not harmful and that: “India could not afford the expense of combating a relatively harmless
habit”[29].
Furthermore, the Canadian representative said that it was necessary to find “a formula which could cover that social but legitimate use of the leaves”[30].
“Social but legitimate use”. As far
as I know, it is the first and last time that this expression was used.
Consumption of cannabis leaves for pleasure is not prohibited by the Single
Convention as the Representatives found it was not a dangerous drug. It is very
important though to note that the authors of the Single Convention did not
excluded every single recreational use of drugs. The Indian Representative
really had to convince the other Representatives, and he did succeed. The
discussion was so controversial, that the item was sent to an “ad hoc committee” that would try to
conciliate the points of view. The Indian Representative fiercely kept his
point of view, so that the definition of cannabis as drafted, was changed to
exclude the leaves. The definition of cannabis is now (article 1.1.b): “”Cannabis” means the flowering or fruiting
tops of the cannabis plant (excluding the seeds and leaves when not accompanied
by the tops) from which the resin has not been extracted, by whatever name they
may be designated”. The leaves of cannabis are therefore not in any
Schedule of the Single Convention. But it does not mean that the cannabis
leaves are a totally free drug in the International Law: “The leaves of the cannabis plant (…) are not “drugs” in the sense of
the Single Convention.(…). Parties are not bound to prohibit the consumption of
the leaves for non-medical purposes, but only to take the necessary measures to
prevent their misuse. (…). The conditions under which non-medical consumption
might be permitted might also depend on the outcome of the studies which at the
time of this writing are being carried out concerning the effects of the use of
the leaves”[31].
Now, we don’t know what happened to those studies, …
Nevertheless, the problem of
medical use is related to that of social use since at the time the Convention
was drafted, it was not sure whether cannabis was harmful or could be used as a
medical drug. Cannabis as a medical drug… Some representatives indeed (such as
the representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) claimed that
cannabis and cannabis resin were being used in indigenous medicine, and that it
could not be prohibited. On the other hand, other representatives (such as the
representative of France) claimed that some therapeutic use could possibly be
found in the future for cannabis, so that it should not be simply and purely
prohibited. A third position was that of the USA, in favour of a complete
prohibition of cannabis as a “stepping
stone” to heroine. In fact, the value
of cannabis as an antibiotic or as a sedative, was pointed out by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations in a note (“Medical use of cannabis”)
published a few months before the Conference started[32].
Attached to this note was the report by the WHO over “The merits of antibiotic substances obtainable from cannabis sativa”[33].
The Secretary General concluded that the Conference must consider the “possible modification of the provisions of
the Single Convention in order to permit the use of cannabis for the extraction
of useful drugs”.
Cannabis is now listed in
schedules I and IV of the Single Convention. Just like heroine. Schedule IV is
supposed to be the more stringent one. It recommends to the Parties a total ban
on any drug it mentions. Yet it is only a recommendation and a state may still
consider that this drug may be used as a medicine. As far as the recreational
use of narcotics is concerned, we have seen that the textual approach provides
for exceptions to the prohibition of the possession, purchase and culture of
narcotic drugs for personal consumption. Furthermore, cannabis has a special
statute as we can find it in the preparatory works of the single convention.
This contextual approach confirms the textual one and at this stage, we can
draw the following conclusions. First, we can say that cannabis leaves are not
a drug and dealing with it does not oblige the state to use article 28: a state
can authorize the recreational use of it without violating the Single
Convention. Secondly we must note that cannabis resin or the flowering tops and
fruiting tops of it are drugs, even though their medical use is not excluded by
the Single Convention but, article 28 must in this case be put into force.
Thirdly, it is obvious that if a state decides to legalize cannabis, for
medical or recreational use, it will have to comply with the administrative
provisions of the Single Convention and to explain its legal arguments, as well
as to deal with the International Narcotics Control Board, such as it has been
the case for Switzerland with respect to the heroine trial and for The
Netherlands to the coffee shops. Fourthly, we cannot say that the goal of the
Single Convention (and of the 1988
Convention) is clearly and obviously the prohibition of all the recreational
use of narcotics and it is then necessary to interpret those international
treaties.
“The political and secret transactions of two statesmen who laboured to
deceive each other and the world must forever have been concealed in the
impenetrable darkness of the cabinet if
the debates of a popular assembly had not thrown some rays of light on the
correspondence of Alaric and Stilicho. The necessity of finding some artificial
support for a government which, from a principle not of moderation but of
weakness, was reduced to negotiate with its own subjects had insensibly revived
the authority of the roman senate; and the minister of Honorius respectfully
consulted the legislative council of the republic.”
Edward GIBBON, The Decline and Fall of the
Roman Empire, op.cit., pp. 577-578.
Small bibliography
-
Michel VIRALLY, Le
droit international en devenir, Presses universitaires de France, Paris,
1990.
-
Jean J.A. SALMON, Droit
des Gens, 12th edition, Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles,
Bruxelles, 1994, 777 pages.
-
Ian BROWNLIE, Principles of Public
International Law, 5th edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998,
743 pages.
-
Nguyen QUOC DINH, Patrick DAILLIER and Alain PELLET, Droit International Public, 6th
edition, L.G.D.J., Paris, 1999, 1.455 pages.
-
Jan KLABBERS, The Concept of
Treaty in International Law, Kluwer Law International, The
Hague-London-Boston, 1996, 307 pages.
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Oscar SCHACHTER, International Law
in Theory and Practice, Martinus Nijhof Publishers-Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Dordrecht-Boston-London, 1991, 431 pages.
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Antonio CASSESE, International Law
in a Divided World, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, 429 pages.
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Myres S. McDOUGAL, Harold D. LASSWELL and James C. MILLER, The Interpretation of Agreements and World
Public Order, Principles of Content and Procedure, Yale University Press,
New Haven and London, 1967, 410 pages.
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Nancy KONTOU, The Termination and
Revision of Treaties in the Light of New Customary International Law, Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1994, 169 pages.
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Bin CHENG, « La jurimétrie : sens et mesure
de la souveraineté juridique et de la compétence nationale », Journal du Doit International, 1991, pp.
579-599.
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J.P COT and A. PELLET, La Charte des Nations-Unies, Commentaire article par article, Edition
Economica, Paris, 1991.
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Jean COMBACAU and Serge SUR, Droit International Public, Edition Montchrestien, 1993.
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Fernando R. TESON, « Le Peuple, c’est moi ! The World Court and Human
Rights », The American Journal of
International Law (Vol.81 1987), pp. 173-183.
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Mohamed BEDJAOUI, Droit
International, Bilan et Perspectives, Edition Pedone, Paris.
In a recent book over the concept of treaty in
international law, KLABBERS writes : «any
study dealing with the concept of treaty will sooner or later have to come to
terms with wider notions as to what is meant by law in general, and by
international law in particular »[34].
In fact, we can recall the theory saying that a law without a sanction (this
means enforced in a court of law) is not binding. Do the Narcotics Conventions
build a system of norms providing with sanctions in the event their provisions
would not be respected ? The answer is obviously negative. To the best of
my knowledge, no case was ever dealt with by the International Court although
it has jurisdiction over the settlement of these disputes according to the
Single Convention (article 48) and the 1988 Convention (article 32). We might
think that the international organisations or bodies operating in the field of
control and enforcement of the Narcotics Treaties[35]
have the possibility to sanction an offender. We face here the concept of
« sanction » in
international law… Should a moderate condemnation in appropriate wordings in
the yearly report of the International Narcotics Control Board be regarded as a
proper sanction ? Does a visit in a country by a delegation of the
INCB amount to a punishment ? Well,
to my point of view, it is not, and these actions are the only ones the INCB
ever permitted to undertake. Although, the Single Convention empowers the INCB
to impose an embargo on all narcotic products against an alleged offender of
the treaty. Although the Board can draw the attention of United Nations Bodies
on the behaviour of a state…
We must depart from this rather unrealistic
view : international drug law does exist even if no sanction but for a
moral condemnation is provided. And this is the point : international
(drug) law is of course binding[36],
even without sanctions. It is far out
of my intellectual reach to theorize on the existence of law, but I can see
that states respect, more or less, international treaties. It is rather a
matter of « credit, confidence,
consideration and compromise »[37]
than a matter of sanction. The treaty, according article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on Treaties must be performed by the parties in good faith, it is
the adagio « pacta sunt servanda »[38].
Furthermore, international treaties can be a direct
source of internal or municipal law for the provisions that are self-executing,
i.e. sufficiently clear in order to be directly used in municipal law without
any legislative or administrative intervention of the state. Most provisions of
the Narcotics Conventions are not self-executing. This means that the state
party must take legislative measure in order to respect it. Furthermore, it
certainly gives a greater power of interpretation to the states in the application
of the treaty and it permits a reform of the « application law » if
the state thinks a new one would better fit the goals and obligations of the
Narcotics Treaties. Only very few provisions of the treaties could be
self-executing : for example, part of article 36 of the Single Convention
on criminal provisions and the « non
bis in idem » principle,
article 7 on mutual legal assistance[39]
in the 1988 Convention and article 11 on controlled deliveries[40]
in the same convention. One pitiful example of direct application of article 36
of the Single Convention can be found in Belgian Law.
Illicit importation or
illicit exportation of narcotics can be one same behaviour : a trafficker
going from France to Belgium, carrying drugs. This person is trialed twice for
the same facts : once in Belgium for importation and once in France for
exportation : two trials, two sentences, two jails, one French and one
Belgian. The Belgian « Cour de
Cassation »[41]
referred in 1989, in a classical fashion, to the different goals that are
protected under Belgian and French Law with respect to the second trial of a
drug trafficker. But there is more : the Court also referred to the Single
Convention. In its article 36.2.a..i,
the convention asks that : « each of the offences enumerated in paragraph 1, if committed in
different countries, shall be considered
as a distinct offence ». We
find in paragraph 1, the two offences we are tackling with :
illicit importation and illicit exportation of narcotics. Since the goals of
both the Belgian and French Criminal Law are becoming identical i.e. « the protection of the interests of the European people »[42],
the Court had to refer to the Single Convention in order to be able to conclude
that the second trial, even though obviously relating to the same facts, was
legal. I would like to evidence the real significance of article 36.2.a.i of
the Single Convention. Does it aim at putting someone on trial twice in a row ?
We will analyse the preparatory works of the Single Convention and the Commentary on the Single Convention,
drafted by the UN Secretary General. Did the Single Convention really mean to have a drug
trafficker judged twice ? Is the Single Convention as repressive as the
« Cour de Cassation »
wanted it to be ? I believe not : the aim of this article was only to
make sure that the drug trafficker would not escape to any trial, and
not to have him condemned twice or more because of his so called particularly
bad behaviour. First of all, article 36.2.a.iv of the Single Convention puts a
condition precedent to the application of article 36.2.a.i : the
offender shall be prosecuted by the Party on whose territory the offence was
committed if such offender has not been prosecuted and if no judgement has been
rendered. It is worth mentioning the Single Convention Comment[43]
relating to article 36.2.a.i : « it
(clause (i)) is not intended to violate the principle « non bis in
idem » (prohibition of double jeopardy)( ...) ». This article
only aims at avoiding that a country provides for a shelter to a trafficker[44] :
the extensive descriptions of the
offences aims at giving jurisdiction to the largest possible number of States.
We can find the same opinion in the
discussions that took place during the Conference held prior to the
Single Convention : the members emphasized that this article 36.2.a.i was
not intended to violate the « non
bis in idem » principle[45].
That is the reason why a special clause was added in the article 36 : it
is the constitutional exception that permits one State not to apply a rule if
it is contrary to its constitutional and legal system. It seems that pursuant
the Belgian « Cour de Cassation »
case law the principle « non bis
idem » was none of these exceptions. Some of the members of the
Conference feared exactly what happened
in Belgium during the last thirty years : that someone would be trialed
twice for the same facts, in a clear breach of a human right.