Learning from History
by Peter Webster
a review of:
The United States and International Drug Control, 1909-1997
David R. Bewley-Taylor
London: Pinter, 1999 ISBN 1-85567-610-9
"In reading the history of nations, we find that, like individuals, they have
their whims and their peculiarities; their seasons of excitement and
recklessness, when they care not what they do. We find that whole communities
suddenly fix their minds upon one object, and go mad in its pursuit; that
millions of people become simultaneously impressed with one delusion, and run
after it, till their attention is caught by some new folly more captivating than
the first. We see one nation suddenly seized, from its highest to its lowest
members, with a fierce desire of military glory; another as suddenly becoming
crazed upon a religious scruple; and neither of them recovering its senses until
it has shed rivers of blood and sowed a harvest of groans and tears, to be
reaped by its posterity.. Men, it has been well said, think in herds; it will be
seen that they go mad in herds, while they only recover their senses slowly, and
one by one."
(Mackay 1852)
It is difficult to say whether history or science has been the more ignored in
the making and promoting of 20th Century drug policy. True, both historical and
scientific 'facts' are featured widely in the ongoing drug policy debate. Yet
the choice of which 'facts' are used and the case that they 'prove' is often
seen to be determined by the pre-existing political, ethical, and religious
convictions of whomever is making the argument. The Drug War, or even the United
States' 'noble experiment' with alcohol prohibition, for example, is hailed as a
success or denounced as a failure, and reams of scientific and historical
'facts' are mustered as 'proof', yet the position of the opposing faction always
seems little influenced, much less converted.
In the contemporary scene it might appear that the findings of science are the
more applied to ongoing drug policy debate and formulation.
According to prohibitionists - at least when they are not preaching that drugs
are 'wrong', the 'scourge of humanity' and a 'universal evil' - science is their
mainstay and an inexhaustible well for proving the necessity and effectiveness
of prohibitionary policy. Reformers echo a similar but antithetical line,
quoting statistics and think-tank studies in their argument that prohibition has
failed as a solution to drug abuse and therefore must be part of the problem.
But science seems always such a dull tool for creating or justifying social
policy, especially in an age where 'scientific results' can often be bought like
any other product of industry. Whether science is the more ignored in modern
drug policy would therefore depend heavily on what kind of science we are
talking about. Science as it is perceived and practised by its more
dispassionate advocates may well be a scarce commodity in drug policy debates
and decisions.
As for history, we rarely hear contemporary prohibitionists quoting those who
constructed the very edifice they worship - luminaries such as Hamilton
Wright, Bishop Brent, Adolph Lande and Harry Anslinger - nor do prohibitionists
often attempt to justify present policy through an historical examination of how
and why the forerunners of modern drug policy came into existence. Presumably,
any modern institution would be capable of
illustrating its legitimacy through an examination of its history, evolution,
and the biographies of its establishing figures. But when it comes to
prohibition, history reveals a dirty little secret: Prohibition has been brought
to us by a remarkably small coterie of messianic do-gooders, the remnants of
19th Century radical temperance movements and other assorted fanaticisms. And
the history of the establishment of the world prohibitionary regime shows
coercion, bribery, dirty tricks, and imperialist manoeuvrings were more often
than not the methods used, racist-colonialist and culturally-biased attitudes
the guiding outlook of its instigators. History may thus demonstrate that for
the messianic do-gooder any and all means to an end are justified - no matter
what the moral contradiction or collateral damage - or that their professed deep
concern for the welfare of the human race is a mere cover story for personality
traits that might better be treated than revered. No wonder then that the
history of prohibition and its architects is rarely mentioned by present-day
descendants of the moral entrepreneurs of yesteryear.
The failure of history to support the legitimacy of modern-day drug policy goes
back much further, of course, to a long series of failed prohibitions
commencing with the first Western Drug War, that against Native Americans of 500
years ago who were treated with the greatest of barbarity by the
Inquisition for their age-old traditions of 'drug abuse'. As for sufficient
condemnatory historical evidence of modern Drug Warriorism, however, we may
confine our attention to prohibition in the 20th Century and the small band of
true believers who foisted prohibition on the entire world as if it were the
long-lost 11th Commandment. Indeed, history shows not only that modern
prohibition springs from the minds of a small cohort of devout zealots whose
methods, hypocrisies, and professed moral stance leaves little doubt that a
dubious religious fundamentalism is at the root of their
convictions, but an even more comprehensive history shows that the fertile
ground that enabled prohibition to become a world-wide fiasco - the
extraordinary receptivity of the 20th Century western mindset - also must be
understood in a religious and psychological context if we are to explain
how prohibitionist efforts have made such remarkable progress.
The existence of a modern vacuum of belief in the organised religions - the
beliefs that shaped human psychology for millennia - combined with the
undoubted persistence of archaic instinctive necessities that enabled such
religion to thrive and propagate over the ages, have resulted in a 'common
modern man' who in default of, and as a substitute for the designated demons of
the past, is quite obviously prepared to believe practically anything at all a
devil and 'universal evil' worthy of crusading against.
Formerly, only the highest religious authorities were accepted as genuine
proclaimers of what was, and what was not the work of Satan. Today, the
merest politician or Ph.D. in political science may lead us off on a
well-attended crusade against ultimate evil. History shows that modern man has
fallen for the drug-as-devil paradigm as thoroughly as medieval man was sucked
into his belief in witchcraft. Ostensibly rational and scientific, and having
laid aside superstition and primitive delusion, 20th Century
Man seems a victim of the greatest of all superstitions - that he is no longer
affected by the archaic structures of his own nervous system and the
associated instinctive drives that evolved over millions of years, a period
compared with which the duration of our enlightened age is but a heartbeat.
2.
There is little to criticise in David Bewley-Taylor's expanded and
much-developed doctoral thesis, The United States and International Drug
Control, 1909-1997, although I suppose that some professional historians may
raise a few points of debate and disagreement. For example, the author's new
views on the role of Harry Anslinger in the construction of modern prohibition
are particularly interesting and thus certain to draw some rebuttal from those
having already gone on record with differing views. The new view seems to
clarify and demystify Anslinger's role and make of him a figure of lesser power
than has been believed by those wanting to see him the primary and influential,
single-minded architect of the regime that has led to today's drug policy woes.
As revealed by Bewley-Taylor, Harry was above all a bureaucrat who, like J.
Edgar Hoover, managed through all sorts of tricks and manoeuvres to attain his
main goal: staying in power far longer than his accomplishments would have
merited. He was apparently often at odds with the U.S. State Department and
other U.S. officials and policies, and thus he now appears far more the
permitted fool than the approved spokesman for the U.S. position over the years.
The result is that we now have a far less important scapegoat for the idiocies
of modern prohibition, and must attribute them more widely.
As for the book's mechanical aspects, it is well-referenced, as one would expect
of a thesis, and chapter introductions and conclusions are well composed and can
be effectively used as a refresher to the arguments. Yet I did find the early
part of the story a bit brief for a reader who is new to
the topic: It seems written as a mere introduction and prelude to the more
informative chapters on post-WWII drug control policy. Thus interested
readers might also profitably refer to other classic histories such as Musto's
The American Disease to more fully understand drug policy developments of the
early years of the century. Bewley-Taylor's narrative really gets going when
telling the details of drug control in the 1950s and 1960s, and here the
story-telling is especially clear and engaging. But I also found the occasional
paragraph somewhat over-written, too densely expressed or with ambiguous
punctuation, and thus tricky to understand at a first reading. And here and
there in the book some major idea or finding is repeated excessively, but these
minor faults of style by no means distract from the far greater content that
must be praised.
The dirty little secrets about prohibition are well-covered in this lucid
history of 20th Century International Drug Control - a misnomer if ever there
were one - and the book incites one to explore new avenues for understanding our
present folly and the great, seemingly insurmountable difficulty in reversing
it. The centrality of fundamentalist moralism and messianic crusading in the
story of prohibition is revealed in all its vainglory, and impels one to see the
entire institution of 'drug control' as a misguided religious phenomenon or even
perversion. Such excellent history teaches the lesson that drug policy reform
efforts should pay more attention to history than has been the case, for the
history we read here seems a far sharper tool for proving the futility and
self-defeating nature of prohibition than the run-of-the-mill scientific
research on drug policy that is so often presented in debate.
Not only should the history of 20th Century prohibition told here discredit all
current reliance and belief in it for many readers, but the story also
illustrates the way the U.S. installed world prohibition and the U.N. drug
treaties - via threats, bribes, coercion, back-room meetings and tactics - never
through informed debate by all parties - and thus de-legitimises those treaties
to such an extent that no one today should be foolish enough to believe they are
up-front agreements between nations existing for the common good of all. Bewley-Taylor
shows that the U.N. drug treaties today
serve mostly to infringe the rights of nations to develop their own approaches
to drug policy - approaches that are less contaminated with anachronistic moral
zealotry and above all more effective at reducing the social problems associated
with drug use. The Single Convention Treaties appear like a Faustian bargain
signed by all the world's nations in a moment of ignorant panic, and now we seem
in mortal fear even of questioning their legitimacy much less telling the Devil
where He can get off. Perhaps it is a shame we no longer have Harry Anslinger to
blame as top devil in this affair, for blame must now reside now with many who
should have known better.
Bewley-Taylor's three major themes, well described in the Introduction, deal
with the relationship of U.S. power and hegemony to the prohibitionist
enterprise, the frequent discrepancies between the announced goals of
international drug control and Washington's wider foreign policy objectives, and
interpretations of the reasons for such oscillation of policy. Bewley-Taylor
remarks, "Washington has frequently pursued wider foreign policy objectives that
have undermined its own goals for transnational drug control - a paradox that
continues to characterize contemporary U.S. narcotic foreign policy.. U.S.
narcotic diplomacy can ultimately be understood as the product of oscillation
between two forces. These are, first, American moral idealism and, second, what
can be termed political realism: an approach to foreign policy based on rational
calculations of power and national interest."
Since the events of September 11, 2001, however, the nature of Washington's
goals and intentions for its role in the coming century - aspects of U.S.
power that have been ever-present but largely concealed from those outside the
inner sanctum of U.S. government - reveals that much of what America has been
thought to be is a myth. What Bewley-Taylor calls a paradox may have been more a
high-level strategy of the National Security State that the U.S. has become
since WWII, the apparent oscillation a mere artefact of an overall covert and
constant strategy by the National Security Honchos in the U.S.'s highly opaque
security apparatus.
That power corrupts is certain, and that the rich and powerful in the U.S. must
by nature have the same human faults as the rich and powerful of other
times and places, cannot be doubted. Being born and rising to power in America
carries no special guarantee that God is on one's side, despite
oft-heard odes to the contrary. Thus we must suspect that the supposed moral
idealism of the U.S. and its leaders may well be a cover story and one of the
great myths of the modern age. Just as the new views presented about Harry
Anslinger make him appear far more the permitted fool than the
guiding light, it now seems that American moral idealism has for some time now
been the 'permitted nonsense' - truly believed by the masses and even
most of the politicians and spokesmen for U.S. goodness, of course - helping to
obscure the obvious fact that American power has all along been like any other.
Post 9-11 events are beginning to show America in another light entirely, and
are leading to a re-evaluation of much of what America has done since Harry
Truman dropped the Big One on Japan, ostensibly to avoid the projected American
casualties of invasion, but more realistically to prevent the Soviets from
getting wild ideas. The string of atrocities that followed over the years, from
Vietnam right through to the U.S.'s predominant role in forcing sanctions on
Iraq that have directly caused the deaths of untold numbers of Iraqi innocents,
including women and children, make the idea that America is even moderately
guided by moral idealism and concern for other cultures more than a mere myth.
The nature of great overweening wealth and power is revealed once again, and is
no different than it has been throughout the ages, although far better equipped.
Harry Anslinger, however, was a 'permitted fool' not because he was too powerful
to remove, like Hoover, but because the foolishness was perceived
as advantageous to those in the inner sanctum of U.S. power. Since the quirky
nature of the 20th Century western mindset was so susceptible to the
fanaticism of prohibition, far be it for Washington's powers-that-be to ignore
the phenomenon or squelch those who wished to incite it. It was rather put to
use with a vengeance. And so with the 'permitted foolishness' of America's
purported promotion of and overriding concern for democracy and human rights
around the world, America's help for the poor and disadvantaged of the world.,
what more effective banner - perhaps 'shroud' would be a more accurate term -
for world domination could exist than such self-proclaimed largesse and
heart-felt concern? No matter that the masses still believe the myth in their
hearts, nor could they be convinced otherwise even by a protracted history
lesson, so strong are their convictions. As Nietzsche warned, "convictions are
more dangerous enemies of truth than lies."
Although there is plenty of evidence in Bewley-Taylor's document that incites
one down such avenues of informed speculation, he correctly avoids
going into such matters directly, leaving us with only the obvious suspicions
about the 'paradox and oscillation' of U.S. policy. He does state clearly that
"The fight against drugs is almost certainly being used as a cover to increase
U.S. influence in the [Latin American] region and reassert hemispheric
hegemony." But I would go much further, and insist that it is global hegemony at
issue. When Bewley-Taylor writes,
"The Department of State's belief . that its international successes against the
drugs trade 'confirm the general soundness of [our] approach' affirms that the
United States pursues an international strategy based on prohibition with the
same enthusiasm today as it did in the early decades of the twentieth century.
American officials follow the same path as that trodden by Brent, Wright, Porter
and Anslinger. A steadfast belief in the moral superiority and practical
effectiveness of U.S. prohibitive policies has maintained the momentum of
proselytization. This has remained so despite abundant historical and
contemporary evidence to show that the policy is ineffectual in dealing with
illegal drug use. References to the drug trade as an 'opportunistic disease that
breeds only amidst social and moral decay' demonstrate a continuing
preoccupation with morality rather than the concrete socioeconomic realities
that often underpin illicit drug use."
I would say that those in the U.S. State Department convinced of prohibition's
worth, or those following in the footsteps of early prohibitionists or so
concerned with the morals of the entire human race, are either 'permitted fools'
or actually 'encouraged fools' and that those in the higher strata of power are
the ones doing the permitting and encouraging in line with an overall and
well-calculated, if cynical and anti-democratic strategy. If, on the contrary,
the highest levels of U.S. power are infested with people of the intellectual
calibre of the Bishop Brents and Harry Anslingers of this world, we are in a
great deal more trouble than even conspiracy theorists suppose. A more realistic
view, reinforced by post 9-11 evidence, would indicate that although there are
plenty of complete idiots in Washington, we must assume there are some others at
the top, far more informed and aware, who know as we do that prohibition and
'supply-side control' of drugs cannot possibly work, and never have. Those at
the top surely are, and have long been far more like Nixon, Kissinger, Haldeman
and Hunt than the moralising front-men now leading prayer sessions and
hymn-singing bashes in their hallowed Washington offices, the 'encouraged fools'
placed in the media limelight as if they were the free world's caring and
squeaky-clean leaders. Thus the 'continuing preoccupation with morality' is
surely the permitted and encouraged foolishness of a higher level power
structure.
Such a story is far more difficult to research and tell convincingly, even with
post 9-11 developments in evidence, and of course goes far beyond the
perimeter of the story of the U.S. and international drug control. And, of
course, this book was written before those great events which have changed
the course not only of history but of the perception of America's role in the
history of the modern world. And perhaps these are concerns best left
for the history writing of a future age, for at the moment we appear to be going
down the road well-described by Mackay, enjoying our seasons of
excitement and recklessness, when we care not what we do, not to recover our
senses until we have shed rivers of blood and sowed a harvest of groans and
tears, to be reaped by posterity only eventually to recover our senses slowly,
and one by one.
It is tempting and reassuring to believe that we here in the extra-American
world might continue to make step-by-step progress in developing effective,
even revolutionary drug policy, even to the extent of slowly shifting the
position of the U.N. toward recognition of the faults of its international drug
treaties despite U.S. dominance of that august body. And that this progress must
eventually start to erode even the obsolete position of the United States
federal government itself. Given the facts of the current situation, however, I
suspect that the most that can be done in the near future is to further increase
the polarisation of position on drug policy, with the United States becoming
ever more repressive and oppressive, the Europeans slowly more bold and united
against the U.S. Somewhere along in this process, with men 'one by one
recovering their senses', a groundswell of realisation must occur, and the
entire concept of prohibition be widely seen for the folly that it truly is.
Whether there remains sufficient time for the lengthy and patient effort that
will achieve this end, or whether ecological, financial, and/or political crises
will soon make advances in drug policy a mere unaffordable luxury, is an open
question. What is worrying is that there appears to be a current parallel to the
way the U.S. fomented the panic that led to our modern, truly insane policies on
drugs:
Another and even greater panic is now being fomented on us all, that Armageddon
is just around the corner and will be brought to us by terrorists and
axis-of-evil perpetrators whose main preoccupation is hating American-style
freedom and democracy. And that we must fight an everlasting war against those
who threaten that freedom. There is an ironic truth here that Jefferson would
have greatly appreciated.
We have for some time been living in a world where, as Aldous Huxley predicted
in 1958,
"The constitutions will not be abrogated and the good laws will remain on the
statute book; but these liberal forms will merely serve to mask and adorn a
profoundly illiberal substance. [W]e may expect to see in the democratic
countries a reversal of the process which transformed England into a democracy.
All the traditional names, all the hallowed slogans will remain exactly what
they were in the good old days. Democracy and freedom will be the theme of every
broadcast and editorial -- but democracy and freedom in a strictly Pickwickian
sense. Meanwhile the ruling oligarchy and its highly trained elite of soldiers,
policemen, thought-manufacturers and mind-manipulators will quietly run the show
as they see fit." (Huxley 1959)
3.
When even such great scientific minds as Baroness Susan Greenfield's can be
entrapped in fuzzy thinking for support of the prohibitionist folly - and
many other scientific names of renown could also be mentioned - we should
realise that science will continue to be a fickle ally in reforming drug policy.
History may prove to be a more effective tool, yet reading the history of drug
control, we cannot fail to see the religious nature of the enterprise, and
religious conviction is the kind of thing that sticks in men's minds long after
scientific and historical proof of its folly has been established. Most of us
are apparently still too immersed in our times to understand that prohibition
fulfils a religious need in its supporters, far more than a political or
regulatory need, and that 'drug crimes' are the modern analogue of the heresies
of ages past, prosecuted as a pretext for the gratification of political,
cultural, and religious hatred. The parallel to the Inquisition's fixations and
persecutions could not be more evident.
The final question we must ask is : If both science and history are such weak
weapons in the war on prohibition, where shall we turn for assistance?
What must be exposed and attacked is the higher level cynicism and intellectual
corruption which continues to use prohibition as a tool for wider strategies.
This will be no easy task, and history teaches that attacking such a superior
enemy is best done by stealth, and by helping along the self-destructive aspects
of such enterprises. Encouraging a religious mania - even one illegitimately
promoted by the corrupt and non-believing popes of Washington - to continue on
enthusiastically to its logical conclusions is one time-honoured way to tackle
it, but I might suggest another, and recent events have shown that it is
effective. High-level judicial decisions, such as those by supreme courts of
nations or by international courts, are in a sense similar to the papal edicts
or other religious statements of infallible authority of ages past, and
encouraging the various judiciaries of the nations and world to pass
condemnatory judgement on prohibition may well be the most effective pathway to
reform. History and science may be brought to bear in this process, but it takes
religious techniques, or their modern equivalents, to attack and dispel
religious delusion.
References
Huxley, A. Brave New World Revisited. London: Chatto & Windus1959
Mackay, C. Extraordinary Popular Delusions & the Madness of Crowds, preface
to the edition of 1852. Republished New York: Crown Trade Paperbacks. 1980